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ABSTRACT
Prosperity and Stability in Hong-Kong-- A Cultural Approach*
The framework of analysis begins with the constructio n of the "static
morphologic al structure" of a political economic system emphasizing a
hierarchize d class structure.

The dynamics of the "rational interclass
mobility," that involves human activities in the economic as well as the
political domains can then be explored in an integrated fashion. It will then
be shown that the traditional cultural values that provided the basic
motivating force for the operation of the integrated system in the traditional
agrarian society (i.e. of traditional China) is still operative in the modern
technologic al society--us ing the case of Hong Kong as a concrete illustration .
*This is the second part, i.e. a continuatio n of the first part, of a paper
entitled "Economic Development and Traditional Cultural Values," written in
1985. The overall conclusion of these papers is that when what is fundamental
is known, an ancient culture of an agrarian society can survive in the modern
technologic al society with only slight modificatio ns. Moreover, since the
"fundamenta l" cultural tradition is on secularisms and "rational"
egalitarian isms, economic prosperity and social political stability are
ensured.

Prosperity and Stability in Hong Kong-a Cultural Approac h

by John C.H, Fei
January, 1987

Introduct ion
In the modernization processes of the less develope d regions of the
1
· world, the post War "economic miracle on the rock" in Hong Kong ( to be
abbreviated as H.K.) is matched by her social political stability that is so
rare in the contemporary scene. Her economic prosperity and social
political stability are so well known and yet so complex that what we
2
have here is a puzzle. To solve this puzzle one would almost have to take
a cultural approach, that has the power to cut through the artificial
"disciplinary" boundaries of economics, political science and sociology, as
will be attempted in this paper.
Since the overwhelming majority in H.K. is Chinese, it is inevitable to
bring "traditional China" into the picture in a cultural approach. When
economic prosperity and political stability are carefully defined and when
what I regard as her "fundamental cul~ural values" are correctly
identified, the central thesis of this paper becomes a "cultural
deterministic" one, namely, the former (i.e. prosperity and stability) will
be shown to be merely a product of the latter (i.e. cultural values).

1

. Framework of Analysis
Our framework of analysis will begin by a "picturing" of the "static
morphological structure" of a political-economic system emphasizing a
hierarchized class structure (section 1). The dynamics of rotational
interclass mobility that involves human activities in the economic as well
as political domains will be explored (section 2). The traditional cultural
values that support these rotations will be identified and analyzed in the
economic and political domains (section 3). Finally, the linkage of H.K. and
traditional China, cultural or value-wise, will be explored, in an
evolutionary perspective, in the concluding section (4).
Our paper will hopefully reveal what may be called the "fundamental
cultural values" that provide a hereditary linkage between the
technological society of- Hong Kong and the agrarian society of traditional
China. To me, the case of H.K. is interesting primarily because of the fact
that it is a small window showing that when what is "fundamental" is
known, an ancient culture of an agrarian society can survive in a modern
technological society with only slight modifications. Moreover, since the
"fundamental" cultural trait is on secularism and rational egalitarianism,
economic prosperity and. social political stability are ensured.

2

Di a gram 1: Polit u I somorphori sm
(* The lsomorphonsm:

tr,e honzontal dotted lines linking

Di egrem 1e end 1b )
,cl,c!l,'r>t.

rtb-,1l,en

~,&,H.-t,..

-------------....;.-t Time
Queen

- - -- 0

1,l.,t,l,h,,,A n ii1b:J,~,Q>k

0 - - --

t"lonerch
·

'. .r/)
--Government -- .
_,;. - 13«
---~---() ---------Nomination -.,..----r-ea.u.c. ¥'tx. c.-)'

A.

u ~dl,'~1

..- - -

Emfucr
- - - - -r-lor,d,'J••'-~
- - - -frem/er
<:

('.::,.,.,-,--

i1,•-li·ct1.l
O..rlpi.t

------- Screening ------Elite--...
C
- t
-...>OCl
e y--·

(a) Hong Kong

(b) Tredi ti one l Chine

Exchanges - - - - - -·,.
guided by
Merkel. Inf ormet ion

__-

o :

• ·'

(c) Pri vete Economic Domei n:
Market System

">t

fr l,lj

1. Static Morphological Structure
. The polity of traditional China is indicated in diagram 1b to show its
morphological "isomorphism" (or simiiarity in forms) with that of Hong
Kong. While the similarity may be somew hat superficial, it is,
nevertheless, crucial if certain key aspect s of the polity of Hong Kong,
with her overwh elming (over 95%) Chinese population, is viewed as an
evolutionary descen dant of the traditional one. The static morpho logical
structure reveals certain properties--i.e. hierarchy(1.1 ), separation of
Monarch from bureaucracy(1.2), and elite and non-eli te contac t(1.3)-- that
will be explored next..

1.1) Hierarc hy

and pyrami d

When polity is defined in terms of the related ness betwee n
gover_nment (at the top) and the society (at the bottom ), there is, first of
all, a notion of hierarc hy where an elite class (if~) is sandw iched in the
middle ( see diagram 1). The existence of a static hierarc hy and the elite
class ( a decide d minority) is due partly to certain human "proclivity"
(e.g. aggression, desire for distinction and power, and affluence), and
hence the "benefit"
affluen ce~;{

(~3Jk.) such as social status ~i.~~), material

JJ )and accessibility to political power(¥~) must always be

allocated unequa lly to favor a relatively small minority. This is true in any

3

human society, or even in animal species for which a social hierarchy can
·be defined in the "Dominance System" of sociobiology(see chapter 13 of
Sociobiology, footnote 44).

Thus, a hierarchy always carries a statistical notion of a pyramid such
that the elite class in the middle, while having more of these "benefits"
than the vast majority of non-elite at the bottom (e:g. farmers, workers,
6
and small merchants,· accounting for perhaps over 90 /o of the total

population), has less of the same than a small core of elite absorbed
formally into the government sector.
In diagram 1a,b, a non-elite in the society is represented by a dot"."
while an elite, by a circle "o" appearing at the society level at the bottom
and the "elite level" in the middle. There is an even smaller core (i.e. a
$Ub-class) of elite, described as absorbed elite who, after being absorbed
formally into the government sector, enjoy more "benefits" than other
elites and non-elites.
A basic trait of traditonal Chinese culture is the recognition of the
inevitability (if not desirability) of a hierarchical polity as natural. In the
Confucian tradition, the very notion of rules of propriety

{:f u) prescribes

the status distinction not only between the emperor( lz) and subordinates

(ltt¾), but also that of the high class (-:t KA__ ) and common people

<:Jf,N- Different classes are clearly delineated and differentiated by
4

codes of dressing~) and rituals¢f0J_(}. In addition to this, "laws"
are dichotomized into "proper rules of conduct"(~) and "corporeal

1)

punishment"{:if-1 to be applied discriminatorily to the two classes
separately ( ~j

+~~t-._. ;~ ~ 1 jt ~ ).

The political cultural trait (so strange to the Western ears accustomed
to "democracy" and "equality before the law") was well preserved in the
19th century so that contemporary political scientists invariably describe
the traditional Chinese polity with an introductory emphasis on her
"hierarchy"3 . In fact, the acceptance of hierarchy in social classes can be
traced back.to the naturalist philosopher such as Chuang Tze in ancient
China

(~~i 7--Jf'~ ~tf .1~)- Likewise, the society of Hong Kong also has

her hierarchy wlth elite class. A small core of which is also formally

4
abosrbed into the Executive Council and/or Legislative Council.

1.2) Separation of Monarch from Bureaucracy
A closer scrutiny of diagram 1a.b shows that, in the government
sector, there is a separation of the Monarch ( the Queen in Hong Kong and
the Emperor in traditional China) from the "inverted tree like"
bureaucratic network with all its functional departments (executive,
judicial and legislative). 5 When the bureaucracy operates, there is an
upward transmission of information to and a downward transmission of
orders from the chief executive (e.g. the Governor of Hong Kong and the

5

Premier in traditional China) through its own hierarchy of authority, when
'

divison of labor is at work.
In the case of the government of traditional China, the separation of
Monarch from the bureaucracy was a prominent feature firmly established
6
in Han Dynasty ( 200 B.C.). Although the separated system suffered
certain setbacks during the Ming Dynasty (when the premiership was
abolished),7 it is nevertheless a basic feature of the Chinese governme nt
organization. As to Hong Kong, the separation is quite complete in that
the Governor is only responsible to the Queen very indirectly through the
Colonial Office in London.
This very separation is a factor that contributes to political stability.
For when divorced from the frailty of bureaucrats, the Monarch acquires an
8
independent spiritual existence that becomes mighty and "holy" . In
traditional China only "rebels" would dare to challenge the "son of heaven"
(~~) and "His Government". As to the Chinese in Hong Kong, the Queen
symbolizes the might of Her Empire and Her Governor, that is not to be
challenged with impunity.

1.3) Contacts of Elite and Non-elite in the Society
If a hierarchy of social classes (i.e. of elites and non-elites) is
accepted as natural, we can reject from the outset the leftist view of

6

"class antagonisms" and "class struggle" as irrelevant to the social
. political reality of China. For the political process what is important of
the coexistence of elites (i.e. the successful businessmen in Hong Kong
and the landed gentry class (--J; )(J(~~~~ in traditional China) and
non-elites ( small businessmen, workers and/or farmers) is their
"locational" pattern rendering it possible for frequent personal contacts
between the higher and lower classes on a broad front.
The possibility of this contact is represented symbolically by the
spacially spreading pattern of "location" of the members of elite class at·
the society level of diagram 1a.b that is mixed with non-elite. As a
consequence, the elites are familiar with (i.e. constantly informed of) the
problems of the lower classes, and can be contributory to the alleviation
of some of them when they are absorbed into the government in the
political process (see 2.2c). When viewed in this political-operational
perspective, the attitude of higher to the lower class, must obviously be
one characterized by "problem sensitivity" to be reciprocated by a sense of
"respect" in the other direction. Otherwise, the lower class can not be
represented in the political process.
While democracy is a sensitive issue at the present time, we shall
argue that participation in the political process by "representation" is not
all that important as compared with an implicit inter-class "respect".

7

While "representation" is a theoretical possibility, it is of minimal
significance in the case of both H.K. and traditional China, due not only to a
negative reason of "political apathy", but, more importantly, to a positive
value attached to "laissez faire" (see 2.3b).

2. Polity Dynamics
Political stability is a time-specific dynamic concept. In diagram
1a,b, the time dimension is represented by the horizontal time axis (t),
indicated at the top to remind us that our focus is now on dynamic issues
of polity. Two such issues-- "transfer of ruling power of the Monarch" and
"social mobility" that are genealogical sensitive will be analyzed in this
section. While the former is characterized by a "lineality", the latter is
basically "rotational". That the "lineal transfer of ruling power" is a
contributing factor to social political stability will be analyzed first
(2.1). However, our e~phasis is on the economic implications of the
distributional justice implied in a rotational social mobility process (2.2).
The "rotational justice" finds expression in the domains of economic and
political activities that compliment each other. When "Laissez Faire" is
attached with high value, the political mobility in the rotational process
takes on a significance that is primarily "distributional" and becomes
independent of the "representation" aspect of the polity (2.3).

8

2.1} Trnasfer of Monarchy Ruling Power and Revolution
In both Hong Kong and traditional China, the orderly transfer of the
Monarchy ruling power (genealogically to preserve the continuity of "royal
blood"} is symbolic of the stability of the government through time. There
were occasionally abrupt deviations and obstructions of the established
rules of throne inheritance, that tantamount to revolutions (or rebellions
in the case of China}. In this regard the polity is quite stable-though in
different senses- for Hong Kong and traditional China.
In almost 300 years of constitution democracy since the last
"Bloodless" and "Glorious" Revolution (1688A.D.}, the "crown inheritance"
in England has been so stable for so long that few (including the vast
majority of Chinese in Hong Kong) envision the slightest chance of a
"revolution" in ·London. That this has been a contributing factor to the
political stability of Hong Kong in the past can be readily appreciated from
the fact that there has been a near unanimity of expectation and faith that
a pragmatic and workabre termination of the colonial rule in Hong Kong by
1997 is to be achieved by a peaceful process of negotiation,
uncontaminated by termoils and /or revolution, through the good officers
of Her Majesty.
In the case of traditional China, there has been repeated "rebellions"
through dynastic cycles. However, the polity, at the same time, has been

9

extremely stable in that the same polity was restored with little
modification after the rebellious turmoils were over. 9 For traditional
China, the cycles of rebellions and rehabilitations of the same polity are
shown at the top of diagram 1b to remind us that the polity of China is
most rebellious yet most stable as "to rebel is justified". 1O Although we
shall use the expression of "political stability", the readers should
remember that this implies the absence of revolution in England and the
plentifulness of rebellions with resilience in China.
The rotation of "peace (;;~) with unity(~)" and "turmoil

?L) and

· division ( to'-}" has been so frequent in the long history of China, that the
expectation of such cycles becomes a part of popular Chinese political

1~1'.;_,/::,1-i)',

culture ( )(

1-v'- 7--.._1,j; ~

). After nearly 150 years of

turmoils and divisions since the Opium War, the vast majority of Chinese
now expect the imminent arrival of "peace with unity" phase. "Nobody
wants to disturb the hard-earned peace" is the tune of the time in H.K.
while a keenly felt necessity to unite is echoed, if not for China as.a
whole immediately, at least for Taiwan and the Mainland internally and
separately.
The political stability of Hong Kong must be understood not only in
terms of a decolonization process but also, perhaps more importantly, in
terms of the background of our time, i.e. the intrinsic demand for political
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unity which is so peculiarly a part of the political culture of China.
According to Prof. Chien Mu, "from the political point of view, the

1111 This is
unification of China under Chin and Han is itself a miracle.
indeed so when we take into consideration of her population size, the
expansion of her land space, the nonhomogeneity of geographic background
and her linguistic diversity.
2.2) Social Mobility
a) The Two-tiered Rotational Social Mobilit~
The statistical notion of a pyramid of a triplet of social classes {see

1.1) immediately implies that, to sustain the static pyramid through time,
there inust be both upward (i.e. promotional) and downward (i.e.demotional)
inter-class social mobility for the genealogical descendants of members
of the three classes- the bureaucrats, elites, and non-elites. The
simultaneity of "promotion" and "demotion" may be referred to as inter
class rotation. SpecifiGally, inter-class rotations must be carried out at
two levels: the rotation of membership between elites and non-elites at
the lower societal level, and the rotation of absorbed and non-absorbed
elites at the upper level. At both levels. there is a selection process for
which the upper mobility may be referred to, abstractly, as "nomination"
and "screening" respectively for the two levels that, collectively,
constitute a social ladder that can be climbed {see diagram 1a.b).

11

b) Distributional Justice and Social Mobilities
More tharf2500 years ago, Conofucius has fully anticipated the theme
of this paper in his often-quoted statement "distribution injustice is to be
lamented more than economic scarcity"

(1z_j~,i4t~ ). There will

always be unequal distribution of "benefits" (affluence, status and power)
in any society ( H.K., China, U.S. or Soviet Union); a fact that Confucius was
only too realistic to ignore. The "serving" of the cause of distribution
justice is reducible, in our formulation, to the~ regulating the
"nomination" and "screening" in the rotational social mobility process.
In a modern technological society, taking into consideration of the
time and energies spent by an average adult on economic matters, the
"legal justice", that only punishes the law-violating "aggressors" in the
court, must be accompanied by the far more important "economic justice"
that ayvards the meritorious performers, as well, in the market place. The
component parts of the "total justice" that Confucius had in mind must be
viewed in a "complimentary" fashion holistically.
c) The Complimentarity of Nomination and Screening
In H.K., for the vast majority of the non-elite (workers, fishermen,
small businessmen, and/or their sons) the only avenue of "promotion" to
the rank of the elite is to compete successfully in the market place in a
"screening" process. This is complimented by the "nomination" process

12

· when a smalltore of the most successful elite is promoted to the
. ·. •~xecutive" and especialy the "legislative" councit. 12 The complimentary
\nature ofthe:iwo types of promotion is clear from the very fact that it is
the most successful businessmen that stand any chance of being
"absorbed". This is evident when the succint summary of the
"administrative absorption politics" of Prof. King is read carefully:
"An alternative explanation of political stability in Hong Kong
focuses on the support to the colonial government rendered by the
Chinese elites, particularly prominant among which are those in
the commercial and industrial sectors. As hong Kong is not an
independent or democratic state, representative institutions
wherein elites with differentiated interests and resource bases
vie for political power and influence are largely absent.
Nevertheless, elite-group participation in policy making in the
colony is effected through the so-called process of "administrative
absorption of politics."13

There is, however, a strong suspicion that the "synarchy", in the
undemocratic state, is merely a window-dressing formality as the
absorbed elites are not representative of the interest of the mass after
alt. 14 It is true that "the co-option of potentially dis-affected leaders
into the government machinery deprives the protest movements of
leadership and makes the mobilization of the mass for political
movements extremely difficult. 1115 · However, the "leaders" are more likely
viewed, culturally, as trouble makers and are ignored by the mass. The
"nomination" process at the top tells less than a full story of social
mobility when it is divorced from the complimentary "screening" process
at the bottom. With such a divorce, the economic prosperity of H.K. is left
16
unexplained, while her political stability was explained half-heartedly.

13

The social ladder represents "rotational social justice" in a
well-ordered hierarchy with "integrity". The durable Monarch at the very
· top is there to award honorary titles (~{:t.~-:t.#_;{j, in both H.K. and
traditional China, that constitutes political recognition of merits. For
gregarious animal species, the selection of the fittest "political"
leadership for survival ( e.g. a "strong" monkey king and "experienced" food
hunter) is based on "instincts" that, too, recognizes the merit of strength
and /or experience. As in the case of traditonal China, the selection
process is reinforced by cultural values that award the entitlement to
political authority, and is based almost exclusively on the criteria of
demonstrated capacity of "capability and virtues"Q!_f~

0L ). In ancient

China, this principle was best illustrated by the competitive examination •
system

(;! M...t,,l~) which started from Tang Dynasty. It is from this

viewpoint that we shall look closely at the domains of political and
economic activities.

2.3) Political Economic System
a) Domain of Economic and Social Political Activities
Social mobility rotations rest on the foundation of a market system
in which individuals interact directly (via exchanges) as coordinated by
the automatic adjustment mechanism of market signals (i.e. information
on wage, price, interest rate) to achieve the efficiency of division of
labor, essential for economic prosperity. A quality attribute of the market
system is free and fair competition for which Hong Kong has a first rate
reputation in the modern world. That traditional agricultural China also
has a great reputation to match in the ancient world is apparent when the
definition of "economic prosperity" for agricultural societies is examined

14

carefully ( see 4.2).
To mark off human activities in the market system, individuals in the
societies of diagram i a,b, are linked by line segments ( shown in diagram
1c) to show a network of direct interactions in the economic domain via
the use of money as the medium of exchange. This "private" domain of
individualism may be thought of as a "horizontal" component to emphasize
a contrast with the "vertical" network of human relations (i.e. that of
social political inter-class mobility of diagram 1a,b), that takes on a
tinge of "public collectivism" in the social political domain. Economic
prosperity and social political stability are essentially dynamic qualities
of the two domains respectively.
b) Laissez Faire
To the political scientist the "collectivism" of polity is comparable to
a "factory" where political "inputs" flow from the society to the
government and "outputs" flow in the opposite direction (see diagram
1a,b). The "inputs" are "interests" of the various social classes that the
bureaucrats must make an effort to find out ·(i.e. "solicitation") as they are
expressed ("articulation"), clarified when unclear ("communication"),
compromise when in conflict ("aggregation") to determine the package of
outputs flows (legislative, judicial and executive). 17
Since, according to David Hume 18, the stability of assets possession
(i.e. private property including the means of production) is so important
for the smooth functioning of the market system, the political "factory"
will have to produce laws and order (i.e. including national defense,
protection of private property right, settlement of contractual disputes)
plus a minimum package of public services (roads, transportation, flood
controls in traditional China, public health, water reservoir and housing in
Hong Kong) that can only be produced efficiently by the government
publicly.

15

The well-known Laissez Faire (or positive non-intervention) in Hong
Kong essentially means that the "factory outputs" do not go very much,
beyond the minimum package that interferes with and obstructs the
operation of the "horizontal" component. It implies, in particular, that the
"factory output" will not aim at "income transfers" between social classes
(e.g. in welfare programs) that violate the. cardinal principle of income.
distribution justice based on the equalization of opportunity.
Laissez Faire is not only a British culture since Adam Smith, but also
has a long Chinese tradition

~ ~~Ai .y;ri~~. J, ~ di] ;t

)in

Taoism and Confucianism that also saw the importance of the stability of
tt-!} ~tt~l-:s' ). 19 As tuned up by their traditional
assets possession

{itl

cultural values, the Chinese feel they have no right to make demands on
the part of the government { a political culture, see 3.3a below) as they
know that they should take care of themselves {see 3.1 below) in the
economic domain.
11

c) The "ln!:hmendence" of Political Nomination from "Repr~~entative Politv
Prof. King_ refers to the polity (i.e. the vertical components) of Hong
Kong as having an existence independent of economics {i.e. that the former
20
is not ~m "epiphenomenon" of the latter. ) If "Laissez Faire" is a value
consensus, whatever "outputs" produced by the political "factory" beyond
the minimum package b~comes irrelevant to the story of social political
stability. But then the "inputs" {i.e. all the interest articulation,
solicitation, communication and aggregation) into the "factory" become
trivial too as they are merely window dressing formality because everyone
agrees on the desirability of minimization of "factory outputs" with or
without the formalism of consultation.
The "joint rule" {i.e. the synarchy) of the "absorbed elite" and the
"positively non-intervening" Governor {which can now be equated with the
Monarch), perpetuated through time by the rotational class mobility,

16

serves a purpose other than what is to be "produced" by the governme nt
technically. The formalism of the hierarchical class structure, with all
the implied unequal distribution of the "benefits" (affluence, status, and
power), is, nevertheless, important for a good rational reason condusive to
both economic prosperity and political stability, in both traditional China
and Hong Kong. The political nomination {or "recruitment") is but a small
part of the rotational process that must be explored from the viewpoint of
the political-economic incentive effect of a principle of income
distribution justice based on "egalitarianism".

3. A Cultural Determin istic Thesis of Prosperi ty and Stability
To develop a cultural-deterministic thesis of economic prosperity and
political stability, we shall identify the "fundamental" cultural values
(3.1). Since it does not recognize "disciplinary" boundaries, we shall
explore its operational significances in the economic domain (3.2), the
political domain (3.3), where the "mainline" thinking on the "political
culture" will be examined. A synthesis will be attempted (3.4).

3.1) The Fundamental Cultural Values
a) Fundamental Cultural Values
Certain traditional cultural values can and did stand the test of time
so well that we may refer to them as "fundamental". The subtitles of the
short volume, "A Look Into the Contemporary Significance of Chinese

(f{,<j1i}t?Ut1~~~~1l!-<~

Culture from the View Point of Value System"
by Prof. Yu, 21 provide certain "lines" that deserve to be paraphrased

!,~

with slight distortions.
First of all, "from the time of Confucius, human integrity was firmly
established" (

t(~~~i~~G-:)w<.,t,<lt,~tt-~i) ,p.51) so that the

"cultivation of the internal strength is the heart of Chinese moral" (i71~J;. ~~.

17

1~ft-11tt}7t~~~-{2-, p. ~02). The proper rules of conducts
governing the "five pairs" (

:L<1d', i.e. "father-son", "husband-wife",

·"older-youngster", "one-his friends", and, to a lesser extent,
"emperor-subordinate") are but manifestations of that "individual
strength" as social obligations toward "other parties" that one encounters
unavoidably

('3i1~{w<.111lt<-A '1'ts&J~l,~~"-~!, ~ittl-<r. p. 73). Thus, to

the Chinese, human "right" is an alien concept subordinative to a sense of
"contractual social obligation" (t1~.i<-_i)~

,.tt--t.1

~¾tli~" ~ ffl)J.~( f,A ti

,p.95) that is readily extendable (e.g. to teacher-student,

employer-employee, buyer-seller, renter-rentee, doctor-patients,etc.) at
modern time that incidentally renders the high-density living of H.K.

22
tolerable and peacefui.
Although the general proper rules of conduct

CtG) has, as a

by-product, social "orderliness", it is again the individualistic strength
that is basic ( ~ll J

~kl "f ~}!t~~ ~, {!.:$_ ~l*J i~{tf] "-

,p.86). Thus,

in a modern rendition, "crime prevention" takes precedence over
"punishment" as clearly stated by the sage

($.g~~%i~./4..~,/y'5"~~~if ).

1123 , that is to be persistently cultivated
The values of a belief in "one self
by learning and practic es(~~~ ~~ ) gentlemanly endeavorous to the
extreme

~,ite1'i.tJ.f_\~~) with optimism (~w<.~l_)

is exemplified by

(iJ that is busily renewing itself all the time( ~ €} l't, f.:I ~ Jt.
)as ordained by heaven ( ~li'{{, '7, <l 1>A ~ ~ J 1 ).

the _cosmos

5l t1

Jt

b) Bational Egalitarianism and Secularism
While the Western culture had to go through a long process of
secularization, 24 China has always had a secular (i.e. economic) culture
long before the time of Confucius. Indeed, the Chinese wanted to remember
their legendary political leaders (e.g.?,

t} f

f for campass,~#!l for
for fire, ;fi 1, for house, ~11 for agriculture and medicine,

specific pragmatic inventions (such asl
silk, ~J.....

)by associations with

18

v(~ for animal husbandry,'/(_~ for flood control,~J,:&_ for vehicle,

l1 i{.ft

for boats(?), and¼:t,A for written letters) that benefited

economic life. After Buddhism was imported into China, the Chinese,
instead of being celestialized, has in fact secularized Buddhism. 25
Elsewhere in this volume, 26 I have referred to the fundamental
Chinese cultural values as rational egalitarianism(R.E.), interpreted as
believing in equalization of opportunity by relying on one self, and
secularism(S), interpreted as the devotion of their creative energies to
the economic domain to survive and to be prosperous. As an abbreviation,
these values would be denoted as RES. Prof. Yu is optimistic in believing
that, with slight modification, the RES can survive the tests of time(~~t~j

~~-,t~t-~~v~ ~ f

e1 iJ~_)f\ ~'\\ t ~A__

,p. 112), a

· prediction that I fully concur with.
c) lmplication__Qn Rotational Justice
The fundamental cultural value (RES) immediately implies, as a
consequence, a fairness of distribution justice when everyone finds a
deserving right place in the ceaseless rotational class mobility. The
system provides motivating force for endeavours because the enticing
"benefits" (affluence, status and power) of the hierarchized class
structure is unequal. Confucian scholars councilled complacency with one's
right place

c.&ti.~~o.]f,<>,lf~p) with a psychological preparedness

for failure ( a calm unperturbedness followed by tranquil reposeij~ft ~
but only after one makes the utmost effort in self endeavour
~~

<J."'--~ 4

). This is obviously the cultural origin of economic prosperity and

"political apathy"- a contributing factor to social political stability - in
H.K., 27 and traditional China.
When the modern political scientists uncovered a strange political
cultural trait of traditional China, to the effect that the Imperial
Government always took it upon herself to give "lectures" to the society on
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"moral rules'\ they should perhaps pay a closer attention to the content of
the fundamental values (see 3.3 below).

3.2) Ibe

Chinese Economic Culture

The Chinese were tuned up with a social personality described by Prof.
Yu as·:
" There are something good and bad about traditional cultural values.
The good part is that the Chinese love freedom. The bad part is
their "looseness" ~Ji), like a "plate of loose sand"
"Freedom" and "looseness" can almost summarize the entire social
personality of the Chinese inclusive of all social groups at the
1128
higher (scholars, gentry) and lower (farmers) levels

(-i {( <f ).

Most economists would consider Prof. Yu, a very first rate scholar in
philosophical thought; a poor economist. For the loose-sand-like
independence of "self interest", when disciplined by the invisible hand of
the market force, has always been equated with material well-being and
moral strength, since the beginning of the modern growth epoch 200 years
ago, by Adam Smith. Any form of collusion in the economic domain
(monopoly or gentlemen agreement) is a cultural weakness, a cowardly
fear for competition.
That the individualistically oriented fundamental culture value (RES)
is still pretty much alive in modern H.K. is supportable by scholarly
researchers of sociology. In his thesis on social political stability in H.K.,
the "utilitarian familism" of Prof. Lau is defined as the following:
"Briefly, utilitarianistic familism can be defined as a normative
and behavioural tendency of an individual to place his familial in
interest above the interest of the society on any of its
component individuals and groups, and to structure his relation
ship with other individuals and groups in such a fashion that the
furtherance of his familial interests is the primary
consideration. Moreover, among the familial interests
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1129
materialistic interests take priority over all other interests.
Thus, a typical "head of the household" of the family is not a part of

1130 ) and,
"politics" (i.e. "alienated from the social and political order
frankly, doesn't want to be bothered with it ( "most of them are unaware
of any possible forms of interest articulation or interest aggregation, not

1131 ), considering
to say interest representation at the governmental level.
it a waste of time and energy. It is hard to ask him to even "think of the
injustice of colonialism.

1132 He would rather have nothing to do with his

fellow citizens (i.e. "adopt an attitude of avoidance toward other social
groups1133 ) unless his own pocket is at stake (i.e. "a certain amount of
interaction with other social groups is allowable if utilitarian interests
are involved. 1134) All he really cares is the maintenance of laws and order,
by an authority he realy trusts, so that he can have a peace of mind to go
at full speed in chasing after money with a sense of urgency and
immediacy.
Thus, when stripped of the jargon, the "utilitarian familism" is a
perfect definition of an apolitical economic man, the money chasing profit
maximizer in the economic domain glorified by the economists. This is no
doubt a product of the fundamental cultural values of traditional China.
3.3) Chinese political Culture
a) The Moralizing Polity
All human societies have value-preserving institutions to imprint (i.e.
to internalize) the "fundamental cultural values" in the minds of the young
and the old in every new generation via the use of language, spoken and/or
written. In this way, the cultural values survive to form a tradition
that is well known for its continuity and longevity

~~

~j~) in the case

of China. However, the value-preserving institutions, typified by schools,
organized religion, and , most important of all, families, should be
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differentiated from the fundamental values themselves much as an ice box
should be differentiated from the ice cream that it preserves.
A peculiar trait of traditional China with regard to the valuepreserving institutions was that the government,( \1})1J.t~ _l : internally
the saintly way externally the kingly way), played a paramount but
secondary role subordinating to that of teachers

(if~iG t */.z~ ).

That traditional China had a moralizing polity was very much "played up"
by some modern political scientists in their attempt to analyzing political
35 It is well-known that on account of
instability of contemporary China.
her moralizing polity, China has no need for organized church such as the
Catholic Church of the West. Chinese traditional religion comprises the
loosely organized and localistic "cult of worshiping deities and ancestors,

1136 which is still very prominent in Hong Kong.
· and the ereqtion of temples,
With regard to moral matters, the .government has no choice but to be
despotic and paternalistic (much as the Catholic churches), which leads to
both positive and negative consequences. Positively, the governme nt must
look after the "interests"(i.e. the moral fibers) of the people

(°AJA 1 ),

· and in the absorption process the nominees must be those who are capable
and, more importantly, virtuous

~J~~z)- Negatively, the political son ( a-

~) has no "right" to make any demand to the political "father" U(~
and, even less so, to the son of heaven

i)

K:r) who is as "infallible" as the

Pope on spiritual affairs.
The above is, in essence, the mainline interpretation of the political
culture of traditional China (i.e. a stern lecturing "father" that employed
37
1
'good teachers" to teach the "voiceless sons" to be good ). Just as the
economists are snobbishly insisting in the "economic man" as essential,
the political scientists overplay their hands when they insist that the only
essential "content" of the "lectures" is "Thou shall not be aggressive", and
that, supposedly, by such "verbalization" on moral values, the culture
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itself has been preserved to be stable for more than 2000 years.

b) A Thesis of "authority crisis"
Once the moralizing polity disintegrates, authority crises appear.
Such a thesis of social-political instability reads:
"Having suggested a link between the repression of aggression
and the tendency to verbalize moralistically about politics, we are
in a position to.. .introduce the central thesis of this study. We
argue that the Confucian tradition, both structurally and
ideologically, created forms of authority that gained strength by
denying the legitimacy of sentiments of aggression. Therefore,
once this system of authority was dirupted, the problem of
controlling aggression complicated the process of establishing
new forms of authority ... .ln a psychological sense one can indeed
think of the prime function of government as this basic social need
to control aggression; and therefore it is understandable that
civic-oriented socialization processes would tend to focus on the
control of aggression. 1138
When the traditional society evolves to become a technological one,
the e_conomy becomes so complex that the old-fashioned "ice box" is
replaced by an electronic refrigerator. It takes a functionally specialized
court of the government, with lawyers, to administer legal
justice-attending to the minute details of voluminous law codes. The
moralizing polity of China must be amoralized much as the Western
Church that was constitutionally separated from government can never be
merged again. The "authority crisis" thesis predicts that when the
moralizing polity (indicated by a shining star in diagram 1b) is converted
into an amoralizing one (i.e. one without a star in diagram 1a) the process
is unstable.
However, authority crisis did not materialize in H.K., as predicted,
dispite that her Chinese population is no less aggressive than elsewhere
and the fact that her polity was amoralized. The colonial government of
H.K. is not known to be an inculcator of Confucian (or other) moral values.

23

What is wrong with the "authority crisis thesis" is its "formula"
✓that equates the fundamental cultural values of China (i.e. the RES) with

"'aggressionsup pression" (i.e. "denying the legitimacy of sentiments of
,:aggression")~ While crime and punishment is a part of Confucianism, it is
only

a small part of it cf z~,.Z ~.

~~11-<'.jG, ~

t~i f}

*

Z..'-'-<

¥'l, t\1/o.tJf<5' \~~~)t,

). The following quotation of what the sage has

said is very illuminous of the other far more important part:
"Those who loaf around with a full stomach all day long are far
worse than a busy gambler that, to the extent of his earnest
dedication, is virtuous."

<~t~a .i~1~ s.~~~, ~if~~ Ji1\~~~~~1-0t)
1

If the "prime function" of the government is only "to control aggression", the
civilization obviously can not be a prosperous one. Thus, what can not be
explained (i.e. the prosperity) by the celestialism of "Thou shall not be
aggressive" can be explained by the secularism of "Thou shall gamble
"aggressively" in "this" world (and how, in H.K.) to suNive and prosper.

3.4) Com,oetition in the Economic and Political Domain
That what I have just said is meant to be serious can be sensed from the
following quotation from the last chapter of the General Theory of Keynes,
touching on social psychology and distributional justice and aggression:
"For my own part. I believe that there is social and
psychological justification for significant inequalities of
incomes and wealth, (i.e. rational egalitarianism) .... There are
valuable human activities which require the motive of money
making and the environment of private wealth-ownersh ip for
their full fruition. Moreover, dangerous human proclivities (i.e.
aggression) can be canalized into comparatively harmless
channels by the existence of opportunities for money-making
and private wealth, which, if they can not be satisfied in this
way (i.e. in the economic domain), may find their outlet in
cruelty, the reckless pursuit of personal power and authority,
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and other forms of self-aggrandizement (i.e. in the political
domain). It is better that a man should tyrannize over his bank
balance than over his fellow-citizens; and whilst the former is
sometimes denounced (e.g. by the leftist) as being but a means
9
to the latter, sometimes at least it is an alternative."3
(parenthesised expression supplied)

If orie takes a pessimistic view of human nature to equate competiton
(e.g. in markets, exams, Majon Parlor, beauty contest, or Olympic Games)
with "aggression", Keynes argued that the killer's instinct can be
channeled constructively in the economic domain. The Utilitarian
"familisms" in H.K. did just that. (see above 3.2) It is entirely reasonable
to view their earnest competition as a cultural trait and that the Chinese,
at all time, are "Keynesian" in relishing "income distribution inequality",
and the fruit of their prosperity induced by "valuable human activities".
But the same killer's instinct can be channeied in the political domain
too, "as an alternative", stated somewhat pessimistically and facetiously
by Keynes. No_one can doubt the fierceness of the competitive Imperial
Examination System in China ( still evident every summer in Taipei), nor
the fai~ness of the elite absorption system in H.K. (see 2.2c). The
rotational selection of the capable and the virtuous to the top of the
social ladder was a firm part of the political culture of traditional China.
As long as only a small fraction of the total population are competing
earnestly, fairly and orderly for "self-aggrandizement" in the nomination
process, it is not so destructive. The aggressive instincts are channeled
for the minority of players (i.e. the elites) and satisfactory , emotionally,
for the majority of the watchers (i.e. the non-elites) of the "games" of
fair play for which they may become "players" as well in the future.
The above quotation from Keynes reads on as:
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"Though in the ideal commonwealth men may have been taught or
inspired or bred (e.g. as in Imperial China) to take no interest in ·
1he stakes (i.e. income or profit), it may still be wise and prudent
-statemanship to allow the game to be played, subject to rules and
· 4imitations(e.g. non-aggressioon by monopolistic parties), so long
as the averag e man, or even a significant selection of the
community, is in fact strongly addicted to the money-making
·
passion. 1140
d)
(parenthesised expression supplie

Wise and prudent politicians must always be less than candid in being
vocal on popular views and silent on unpopular views for which they have
deep convictions (e.g. the necessity of a drive to make money as a
precondition of prosperity and political stability).
Keynes have, unwittingly, described the moralizing polity of
traditional China where, inspite of a deprecation of merchantile
activities

(~Y. (~ )

on "doctrinal" ground, the merchants have always

been left alone to pursue their pecuniary interests in the economic
domain. Furthermore, during the last 300 years, the merchants have been
fully "legitimized" by the Confucian Scholars as one of the four
occup~tional classes (,11-)f\J. ). their hearty merchantile endeavours ()~1-s')
was viewed quite comparably with the hearty scholarly devotions of the
gentry class as the two classes are integrated, value-wise, to promote a
- cause of social interclass mobility long before the arrival of the modern
epoch. 41 ·

4. Stability and Prosperity in an Evolutionary Perspective

While the traditional Chinese economy was "agrarian", H.K. is a modern
technological state. To bring these two differen t economies into the same
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framework of analysis is based on a hypothesis that cultural values of the
latter (i.e. H.K.) are the results of an evolutionary adaptation of the
former. We shall first examine the definition of "economic prosperity"
for agrarianism in an evolutionaory perspective {4.1) before Chinese
agrarianism is examined (4.2). This paves the way for a speculation on the
roles of traditional Chinese cultural values in the evolutionary adaptation
process on mainland China in the years ahead (4.3), and elsewhere in the
more remote future (4.4).
4.1) Economic Prosperity in Agrarian Societies
In a modern technological society, economic properity is routinely
_defined in terms of gains in labor productivity (i.e. per capita GNP) or
material welfare. This special definition emerged gradually in an
evolutionary process that started with the rapid population expansion
that accompanied the Industrial Revolution at the beginning of modern
growth epoch. 42 The demographic transition enlightened human race,
after Malthus, to the effect that our species would not become extinct so
easily, due to the fact that our production capability will always be more
than adequate to ensure our survival as a species.
However, before we gain such self-confidence under agrarianism in the
historical past, gains in material welfare were subordinated to that of
the animalistic instinct to survive. It was in this term that "economic
prosperity" was defined by all thoughtful ancient wisemen. Obviously, no
cultural value, no matter how superior, has the slightest chance to
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survive (to say nothing of growth) unless the stomaches were filled

·AA._

).

(e\ it

Prof. Hayek, in an article awkwardly entitled "The Rules of

Morality are not the Conclusion of our Reason", puts forth an evolutionary
thesis involving morality and stomach in the following words:
"Our moral heritage (i.e.j_lt¾)in China) becomes an autonomous
endowment, a treasure distinct from- -and in some· respects even
superior to- - reason because it allows us to take account of
effects of our actions which our senses and therefore our individual
reason could not. In short, it was men's un-understood moral
traditions, and not their rational knowledge, that enabled them to
form that extended order of individual interaction (in economic and
political domains) that enables us today to sustain something like
200 times the number of human being that existed 5000 years ago.
I am convinced that this expansion of humankind, and of what
we call its civilization, was made possible-- at least as much if not
!TIOre than by the growth of knowledge or intelligence-- by some
moral beliefs that asserted themselves, not by men increasinly
understanding their advantages, but simply and solely by the
selection of those groups which by adhering to them (e.g. RES in
China) becoming able to build much better than they knew and
succeed1ng to "be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the world and
subdue it" as already the book of Genesis (or Confucianism)
1143
describes the destiny of human groups.
.(parenthesised expression supplied)

There can not be any serious doubt, after Darwin, that the survival
instinct that guides activities in the economic as well as the political
domains, without reasoning, is the strongest instinct at least for the

44 Prof.
gregarious animal species that do not reason about moral rules.
Hayek now upholds the same principle for the human species (that,
unfortunately, does make such attempts) too.
4.2) Economic Prosperity

in Agrarian China

In traditional China, certainly, the regeneration of population was
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glorified at both the micro (family}
(society}

(-!xJJ~f..-.. ) as well as the macro

Qfi~i~.:t..) levels. There is no difference between the wisemen

of the West and the East that, if anything, were even more pronounced on
this score on account of their secularism. When economic prosperity is
equated with the population regeneration capacity, the Chinese, a quarter
of the mankind, was obviously the most prosperous and "selected" race, in
the past.
The paternalistic government, indeed, took good care of both the
"people" and the "commonwealth" by drilling in the minds of the common
folks the value of population regeneration which, when faltered, could be
a cause of great anxiety

(!.,<...z~~JJo ,,,(1~J ).

In the moralizing polity

(see 3.3) of traditional China the society, as a whole (i.e. the governm ent·
and society included), was merely controlled by an "instinct" to survive,
without reasoning, according to Prof. Hayek. I firmly believe that this is
the basic reasons for the resilience of traditional Chinese polity, where
after temporary rebellions, the Chinese always returned to the same
rotational system because their "instinct" told them the old model has
been proved to be so effectively "prosperous".

4.3) Experimentalism

on

Moral Values

The Confucian scholars, that always referred to the animal instinct
derogatively {,i~i_..Ji_

t'J~~~ -) would have certainly protested an

evolutionary view that labels their classics (~

.f :P..?f.) as "unreasoned".

And yet, it was, after all, a Chinese, Lao Tze, that first invented the
thesis of the "impossibility of reasoning on moral rules"( ~q-~yt~ ~)
denouncing all cultures a~d sages

i

~

\~l!~) and glorified the "genes"(i.e.

nature) at the same time. Perhaps Confucius also unwittingly

subscribed to the same thesis when he claimed:
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I only elaborate, and have faith in, what has proved to be
effective from ancient time and make no claim in originality

<1i~~~ i.~ ~ 1 <r

)"

How modest is this statement when compared with the arrogance of the
"Party" of mainland China that had made a "full claim" of such an
originality in their ideological struggle, before 1978 (and in 1987), to
imprint new values of "socialistic man" by political forces and "reasons".
The disastrous "ineffectiveness" of that futile experiment

(1949-i 978) provided a good testimony to the sagacity of the Colonial
government in H.K. that adopted a laissez faire approach in the economic
as well as moral (ideological) domains. It was this moral
non-interference that allowed the traditional cultural values (RES) to
assert itself ~nd follow a natural course of evolutionary adaptation,
withou_t reasoning, that has contributed to the Postwar prosperity and
social political stability in H.K..
In the "Decisions by the Central Committee on the Guidelines for the
Reconstruction of 'spiritual values"' in 1986

~~~~ ~-½

(ii:t~?J,-!?~.:t¼J)({f~f.(~

~le0;,f:J}x), the Party frankly admits that "serious errors

1145
were made in the past for too much emphasis on ideological struggle
while attempting to blueprint, for "Chinese Socialism", a value package
including elements from the West, Marxism, and traditional China, to fill
in the current state of "vacuum". The Party autl1ority now finally
subscribe to the thesis of "impossibility of reasoning" to uphold an
experimentalism ori moral matters (

~>:r-1: ~ ~ ~-R~~ 0;f},*. The

Party also upholds freedom in "debates", "criticism", "creative writing"
and "academic researches", which is obviously essential to accommodate
an experimentalism on moral rules. It is my unconditional prediction that
one of the components (i.e. fundamental Chinese cultural values- RES),
proved to be so effective in H.K., Taiwan, and Singapore in the Postwar

30

the
years, will be "selected" in the not very distant future in spite of
attem pt to revive "reason" on moral rules in 1987.
The only assumption is that, aside from the animalistic aggressive
instinct

N!f!J, there is,

optimistically, also something innate

(j_ ~.

~1\ ~_t z..~-) in the human "heart" (i.e. inwardly-oriented transcendental
valu es.: ~~~ ~

z~~- ~fl.-~'~·) that knows what is good instinctively.

of
In addition to this, to the Chinese there is always an asso~iation
a truly important
"heart" with "endeavour" ( JlJtu~

!1..:s~ :g,~. f ,~· ),

fundamental Chinese cultural values.

4.4) Evolutionary Adaptation of Cultural Values
By the social Darwinism of Prof. Hayek, the moral values of the
future,
Chinese in H.K. in the past, and/or those on the mainland in the
of
can not be anything more or less than an evolutionary adaptation
traditional cultural value to meet the requirements of a modern
the
technological society. There is no need for a moralizing polity as
powerful fundamental values would assert themselves inter
ive by
generationally, and, alter only when proved to be no longer effect
experi.ments in the future.
Many Chinese cultural values highly treasured in the past (e.g.
family
monarchy, moralizing polity, preference for population expansion,
of females
clan, the deprecation of the merchant class, one-man virginity
just to mention a few) were abandoned in the evolutionary

cl ~1 ),

s(see
adaptation process. However, these are IlQ1 the fundamental value
avour a
3.1 a). But as long as economic scarcity prevails that makes ende
(i.e. desire
virtue, as long as human beings have the genes of aggression
long as the
for power, distinction and self aggrandizement), and hence as
unequally
benefits (affluence, power and social status) must be somewhat
class
allocated, and as long as the rotational justice in a hierarchical
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structure (with a polity integrity) is a workable solution, and , most
importantly, as long as personal integrity

(1~~.:A,c•;,:}) matters, there·

is no immediate threat of extinction of the fundamenta l traditional
cultural values-Le. rational egalitarianism and secularism- that will,
hopefully, be proved condusive to political stability and economic
prosperity in the 21st century.
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